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RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS
rules like the act of state doctrine in mind when it decided Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins."4 The Court also stated that "an issue concerned with a basic
choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the
National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of
the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of
federal law."4' There is in this statement at least the implication that
questions concerning foreign relations are issues of federal common law.42
Arguably, Banco Nacional affords a springboard for the application of
federal common law in Somportex. The Court in Banco Nacional used
federal common law because the rule it was concerned with affected our
affairs with foreign nations, and it saw in the Constitution and federal
laws a concern for uniformity in this area.43 Somportex, too, could be
thought to have international ramifications. Encouraging nations to give
our judgments effect in their courts is a legitimate federal objective
which would be advanced by a national policy of reciprocity. In Banco
Nacional, there was no federal law directly involved nor any firm indica-
tion from Congress that federal decisions were desired in this area, but the
Court applied federal common law nevertheless.44
If the court in Somportex had considered the course indicated by
Banco Nacional, it could have decided that the issue of whether to require
reciprocity for enforcement of foreign judgments is a federal question.
The states would then be bound by the federal rule, forum shopping would
be prevented, and a uniform approach in an area of national interest would
be facilitated.
BRUCE J. DOWNEY, III
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection and Residence Requirements
The United States Supreme Court in Shapiro v. Thompson' held
that a one-year residence requirement which denied otherwise qualified
sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own
territory."' Id. at 416.
40 376 U.S. at 425.
" Id.
"'See Comment, Federal Common Law and Article III: A Jurisdictional
Approach to Erie, 74 YATE L.J. 325 (1964).
40376 U.S. at 427 n.25.
"Id. at 416-27.
1 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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applicants welfare benefits was unconstitutional as an impermissible
burden on interstate travel. The Court specifically left unresolved the
validity of other state residence requirements including residence for the
bar.2 Recently, however, in Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners8 a three-
judge federal court used a two-fold equal protection approach involving
"traditional" equal protection on the one hand and the Shapiro rationale
on the other to find North Carolina's one-year residence requirement for
the state bar examination unconstitutional.5 The purpose of this note
is to examine the decision in Keenan and to relate both Keenan and
Shapiro to some other North Carolina waiting periods and residence
requirements.
Keenan was a class action seeking a declaratory judgment that Rule
VI (6) of the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law in North
Carolina, which required one year's residence in North Carolina prior
to the date of the bar examination, was unconstitutional., The two
successful plaintiffs were graduates of accredited law schools and had
been admitted to and had practiced before the bar in other states. Follow-
ing the order of a preliminary injunction, the North Carolina Board of
Law Examiners treated the plaintiffs' applications as though the plaintiffs
were in compliance with the residence requirements and admitted them
to the bar examination since they were otherwise qualified.8
The first standard of review used by the court9 was the "traditional"
equal protection standard which required that the distinctions drawn by
a state's classification have "some relevance to the purpose for which the
2 "We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence requirements
determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-free education, to obtain a
license to practice a profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth." Id. at 638 n.21.
'317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
'See text at notes 9 & 20 infra.
'Another three-judge federal court held that Georgia's one-year residence
requirement for admission to the bar was so discriminatory in light of the meager
state interest served as to deny due process and equal protection of the laws. Web-
ster v. Wofford, 39 U.S.L.W. 2382 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 31, 1970).
' Comity applicants for the bar were also required to be residents of North
Carolina for one year prior to the approval of their applications. This rule was
not challenged in Keenan but was subsequently changed to a sixty-day residence
requirement. See THE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS, RuLEs GOVERNING ADMISSION
TO THE PRAcTIcE OF LAW IN THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Rule VII, § 1(4)
(1970) [hereinafter cited as LAW EXAMINERS].
"A third plaintiff failed to apply for the examination as required by another un-
challenged requirement. 317 F. Supp. at 135Z
a Id.




classification is made."1 0 Borrowing language from the Supreme Court
in Schware v. Bar Examiners" the court in Keenan pointed out that
[i]n licensing attorneys there is but one constitutionally permissible
state objective: the assurance that the applicant is capable and fit to
practice law and that... [w]hile a state can require high standards of
qualification... before it admits an applicant to -the bar, any qualilca-
tion must have a rational connection with the applicant's Jfitness or
capacity to practice law.12
Using this standard the court was unable to find a sufficient connection
between the reasons given for the residence requirement and "fitness or
capacity to practice law."
The first reason offered by the state in relating the rule to the proper
objective was that a residence period allowed the applicant to acquire "a
modicum of knowledge about the state's governmental structure and its
local customs."' 3 Suggesting that "legal usage and practices" are mostly
learned in active practice, the court brushed aside any relevance of
knowledge of local custom with the statement that "[n] either legal com-
petence nor ethical fitness depends upon cultural provincialism."'"
The second reason advanced by the state was that one-year local
residence gives fellow residents an opportunity "to observe the applicant
'in action' " before judging his character and moral reputation. The state
felt "that those most capable of judging and passing upon the character
of an individual are those who actually live in the community where the
1 0Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966) (emphasis added).
12353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
12317 F. Supp. at 1359 (emphasis by the court). See also Konigsberg v. State
Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).13317 F. Supp. at 1359.
1 Id. In view of the growing demand for more local control of government and
for policemen to live within their department's district, knowledge of local custom
and conditions probably has more relevance to the practice of law than the court
acknowledges. Indeed, the Hawaii Supreme Court has recently upheld a three-year
residence requirement for state legislators on these grounds and noted that at
least three states have residence requirements of five years for candidates for their
state legislatures. Hayes v. Gill, - Hawaii--, -, 473 P.2d 872, 878 (1970), appeal
dismissed as moot sub nom. Hayes v. Lieutenant Gov. of Hawaii, 91 S. Ct 1200
(1971). In another case the Supreme Court affirmed a ruling holding. Alabama's
requirement that state circuit judges reside in the circuit one year prior to their
election constitutional. Hadnot v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970),
aff'd, 91 S. Ct. 1189 (1971). Nonetheless it is also true, as the court in Keenan
and the dissent in Hayes conclude, that regardless of whether or not the knowledge
is relevant, residence is not adequate as a test of whether a particular applicant
has the knowledge, 317 F. Supp. at 1359; - Hawaii at -, 473 P.2d at 884.
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applicant resides."15 The court rejected this argument and found that
there were less onerous and more effective methods of determining char-
acter. Acknowledging the nationwide investigating service of the National
Conference of Bar Examiners, and the bar examiners' power to require
the applicant's cooperation, the court concluded that a nonresident's fit-
ness to practice law "can be accurately determined in each case only by
investigation of the applicant's out of state background."1 6 Thus, since
an out-of-state background investigation would be necessary, the court
suggested that a "reasonable" fee could be charged the nonresident appli-
cant to cover the additional costs and that the date for filing applications
could be set far enough in advance of the examination to insure adequate
time for reviewY
The third reason for the one-year residence rule was that it "evidences
a bona fide intent to become a permanent resident of the community, such
permanence being desirable for an attorney."'" Here the court did not
dispute the desirability of permanence but rather discounted the value of the
requirement since "[i]n our highly mobile society, one who has lived in
a particular locale for one year may be firmly rooted in the community
or he may be ready to move on tomorrow."'
" Supplemental Memorandum for Defendant at 17.
" 317 F. Supp. at 1362. See Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961) ; Konigsberg
v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961). Viewed against the arguments of those who sug-
gest that the only purpose of such residence requirements is to protect the economic
interests of the local attorneys, the state's arguments for the rule seem even weaker.
See 317 F. Supp. at 1360 n.12; State v. Johnston, - Hawaii -, -, 456 P.2d 805,
812 (1969) (dissenting opinion); Barron, Business and Professional Licensing-
California, A Representative Example, 18 STAN. L. REv. 640 (1966); Mann, Not for
Lucre or Malice: The Southern Negro's Right to Out-of-State Counsel, 64 Nw. U.L.
REv. 143' (1969); Note, Attorneys: Interstate and Federal Practice, 80 HARv. L.
REv. 1711 (1967); Note, Admission to the Bar: By-Product of Federalism, 98 U.
PA. L. REv. 710 (1950).
"1 317 F. Supp. at 1360-61. The Board of Law Examiners has adopted both
measures. See LAw EXAMINERs Rule V, § 2 (moving filing date ahead two months
to six months before the bar examination) and Rule V, § 3 (authorizing fee).
10317 F. Supp. at 1359.
10Id. Interestingly, the best example of the problem is James Keenan, one of
the plaintiffs. After six months residence he was admitted to the bar in Texas on
May 13, 1969, but only several days later left the state to work for an OEO Office
in New Orleans. See Supplementary Memorandum for Defendant at 19. The
answer for the state is to restrain or punish those who interfere with the court
system after their admission to the bar rather than trying to anticipate which bar
applicants will become transients. See LAw EXAMINERS Rule VI(6); Mann, supra
note 16, at 154; Note, Constitutional Right to Engage an Out-of-State Attorney,
19 STAN. L. REV. 856 (1967). Sanctions against transients can be insured by
requirements of bonding and the use of long arm statutes. See, e.g., N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 85-2 (1965) (requiring bonding for resident auctioneers); N.C. GEN. STAT.
[Vol. 49
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The second standard used to review the issue of equal protection was
the more stringent rule requiring a "compelling" state interest to be shown
to justify a regulation infringing on a constitutional right.2 ° In this case
the court found that the one-year residence requirement undoubtedly
deterred attorneys from other states from exercising their right to inter-
state travel while, as noted above, it did not promote a compelling state
interest or objective.21 Indeed the residence requirement in Keenan is in
many respects a greater infringement on the right to travel than the res-
idence requirement in Shapiro. An indigent does not necessarily expect
welfare in a new state and may have other reasons for moving there which
will cause him to remain even without welfare. A lawyer on the other
hand expects to practice law and is unlikely to move to or remain where
he cannot practice.
The court in Keenan noted other residence requirements for the bar
such as residence at the time of examination, at the time of admission, or
for a short term before admission to insure personal interviews and con-
tact with the applicant, but specifically withheld an opinion as to their
validity.22 Thus the door was not completely closed on state regulation
in the form of some lesser residence requirement.
The North Carolina Board of Law Examiners meet and pass on all
of the applications during a six-to-eight-week period before the bar exam-
ination. Under their rules all applications must be complete by January
10th of the year of the examination in order that preliminary investigation
may be completed before the whole board meets.2 1 Since Keenan, a new
rule requires that a general applicant shall:
§ 84-4.1(3) (Supp. 1969) (requiring out-of-state attorneys practicing in North
Carolina to submit to service of process within the state).
-0 317 F. Supp. at 1361-62. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969);
Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
211317 F. Supp. at 1361-62.
,21Id. at 1362 n.17. Residence after admission to the bar is not required by
North Carolina so it is difficult to imagine a state interest in requiring residence
at the time of admission to the bar. Residence for the bar examination or to insure
presence for interviews, in either case, serves only administrative convenience and
that only indirectly. While the Bar Examiners can clearly require in-state presence
for the exams and interviews, to require the applicant to move his residence
before he knows he will be admitted to the bar is an intolerable burden on the
applicant when compared to the meager benefit to the state. One plaintiff in
Keenan suggested that the rule requiring residence but not permitting the practice
of law was a burden not only on his family but also on his future clients. The am-
biguity of insuring the quality of attorneys in this fashion does not seem to have
occurred to the Law Examiners. Affidavit of Loren Mitchell, Plaintiff's Exhibit E.
"Supplemental Memorandum for Defendant at 11.
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Be and continuously have been domiciled and physically present in the
State of North Carolina from the 15th day of June to the 15th day of
August of the year in which the applicant takes the bar examination. 24
Obviously the Board wants the applicants available for interviews during
final consideration of their applications, and the rule is written strictly to
impress upon the applicant the importance of the interview. But while
the harshness of the rule is mitigated by the fact that those taking the bar
examination will probably be in North Carolina anyway, attending a
bar review course which begins the first week in June, the rule would
seem clearly unconstitutional. Mere domicile and presence within the state
does not necessarily make one more accessible to the Board of Examiners.
An applicant from South Hill, Virginia, is more accessible than one who
lives on the Outer Banks of North Carolina. Furthermore, no legitimate
state interest is served by preventing, for example, weekend trips to Myrtle
Beach, South Carolina. A more reasonable interpretation of the rule
would be that the Board will require the applicant to be physically avail-
able at specific times and will send notice to an in-state location where
the applicant is to be "constructively" present for the entire review period.
Whatever the Board's intent the rule should be rewritten to make its
meaning clear to all bar applicants.
Residence requirements for other professions are as suspect as those
for the bar. North Carolina, for example, has a one-year residence re-
quirement before one can take the examination administered by the Board
of Certified Public Accountant Examiners." As in all occupational
licensing, the state's interest in licensing accountants is in protecting the
public by certifying those with the "capacity and fitness" to practice as an
accountant.26 The residence requirement for accountants, like the residence
requirement for the bar, does not test the applicant's "capacity or fitness"
to practice. Indeed the Florida Supreme Court has already struck down
a similar residence requirement for public accountants in that state. 7
"'LAW EXAMINERS Rule VI (6) (emphasis added). The rule for comity appli-
cants requires only continuous residence and bona fide citizenship. LAW EXAM-
iNwEs Rule VII (4).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §93-12(5) (1965). North Carolina also has a tvo-year
residence requirement for auctioneers, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 85-2 (1965), and a one-
year requirement for bail bondsmen, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 85A-11 (1965). Other res-
idence requirements for other occupational licenses are not statutory, but, like the
bar requirement, are set by the licensing boards.
"
6See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING LEGISLA-
TION IN THE STATES 1-4 (1952); W. HoRowiTz, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING IN
ARIZONA 7-10 (1966).
"'Mercer v. Hemmings, 194 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 1967) (two-year requirement).
[Vol. 49
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Other residence requirements for occupational licenses have the same
failings and should continue to be struck down.28
Most other state residence requirements are designed to prevent over-
loading of state programs by an influx of out-of-state residents. North
Carolina, for example, formerly imposed a four-month residence require-
ment before a woman could obtain a therapeutic abortionse apparently to
prevent the overloading of its hospitals. Since the Supreme Court in
Shapiro said that "a State may no more try to fence out those indigents
who seek higher welfare benefits than it may try to fence out indigents
generally,"'2 it would seem that a state cannot discriminate against those
who may have entered the state for the public benefits it offers. Indeed,
the recent decision in Corkey v. Edwards,"1 striking down the residence
requirement of the North Carolina abortion statute, pointed out that it
was an undue infringement on the right to travel that penalized those
with the bona fide intent of making the state their permanent residence,
which effect was not outweighed by a legitimate state interest. The de-
cision in Corkey was influenced by the realization that the state's abortion
statute, while being progressive, would still not draw a large number of
out-of-state patients. 2 It is nonetheless consistent with the declaration
in Shapiro that "deterrence of indigents from migrating to the state...
is [not] a constitutionally permissible state objective.""8
As state welfare benefits continue to improve at different rates and
2" State ex: rel. James v. Gerrell, 137 Fla. 324, 188 So. 812 (1939) (striking
down requirement for auctioneers); Wormsen v. Moss, 177 Misc. 19, 29 N.Y.S.2d
798 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (striking down requirement for massage parlor operators).2 8N.C. GuN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (1969).
80 394 U.S. at 631.
81322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
,
2
"The state expresses a fear that has not materialized: taxation of our hospital
facilities by an influx of out-of-state patients seeking abortions. We think our law
is not so liberal." Id. at 1254. There was, however, a very liberal abortion statute
before the state legislature which would have permitted termination of pregnancy
during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy on request of the mother. The proposed
statute would have required the mother to have been a resident for thirty days before
the abortion, thereby precluding those who might have come to the state for the sole
purpose of obtaining an abortion. H. 5 (1971 Sess.) (now tabled in the Senate).
This statute would have been liberal enough to draw sufficient numbers of patients
to overburden the state's hospital facilities, in addition to adversely affecting the
abortion policies of neighboring states. The state's interests in this residence
requirement were greater than in Corkey but the statute would still have unreason-
ably discriminated against new bona fide residents as does a proposed thirty-day
residence requirement offered to replace the one struck down in Corkey. H. 626
(1971 Sess.).
" 394 U.S. at 633.
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residence requirements for different programs are struck down,8 4 the prob-
lem of new residents overloading welfare systems will continue to grow.
However, as long as the Court is willing to sustain its declaration in
Shapiro, states will have to find methods for reducing the burden other
than by imposing durational residence requirements. s 5
Another state program which has durational residence requirements
is higher education. The University of North Carolina, for example,
requires six-months residence preceding enrollment to entitle a student to
the lower in-state tuition rate."' The state's interest is to protect its
facilities from an influx of nonresidents attracted by the low tuition
costs." Here again the problem with the durational residence requirement
is that it discriminates against those residents who enter the state with
the bona fide intent of making the state their permanent residence. In
several states this discrimination is limited to one year after which the
student may present evidence that he is a bona fide resident. " In North
Carolina, however, the student must prove six-months residence "pre-
ceding the date of enrollment or re-enrollment, exclusive of any time spent
in attendance at any institution of higher education.""0
"Programs for which durational residence requirements have been struck down
include: King v. Housing Auth., 314 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) and Cole v.
Housing Auth., 312 F. Supp. 692 (D.R.I. 1970) (public housing); Richardson v.
Graham, 313 F. Supp. 34 (D. Ariz. 1970) and Sheard v. Department of Social
Welfare, 310 F., Supp. 544 (N.D. Iowa 1969) (old age benefits); Crapps v.
Hospital Auth., 314 F. Supp. 181 (M.D. Fla. 1970) and Board of Supervisors v.
Robinson, 10 Ariz. App. 238, 457 P.2d 951 (1969) (indigent hospital care).
" The Governor of New York recently asked that state's legislature to enact
a-one-year residence requirement for welfare benefits which would be effective only
during a five-year "emergency" period. The Governor, recognizing the Supreme
Court ruling in Shapiro, asserted that the conditions that now exist in that state,
which has the highest tax burden in the country and an acute housing shortage,
constitute a "compelling" state interest for the imposition of such a requirement.
He concluded that "[t]his step is essential to protect the state's economic and
social viability." N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1971, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
" RECORD OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL, SCHOOL
OF LAW 18-19 (1970) [hereinafter cited as RECORD].
"' For example, tuition for the Law School is 112.50 dollars per semester for
residents and 475 dollars per semester for nonresidents. Id. at 18.
" See Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260,
267 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1970); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 124-18-3 (Supp. 1967); Comment, Residency, Tuition, and the Twelve-Month
Dilemnma, 7 HousToN L. REv. 241 (1969). But see Comment, Nonresident Tuition
Charged By State Universities in Review, 38 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 341 (1970).
" RECORD 19 (emphasis added). This rule applies to students over twenty-one.
Under this rule one who comes to the state to attend Duke University undergrad-
uate and law schools would still be considered a nonresident for tuition purposes
if he then entered graduate school at the state university even though he had been
a resident of North Carolina for seven years. There is a different set of rules for
minors. Id. at 18.
[Vol. 49
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Since the state's main bulwark against an influx of nonresidents is
to impose quotas on nonresident students by a set percentage, or to enforce
higher admission standards for such students, it is hard to justify the
strictness of the North Carolina rule. In fact courts have generally looked
with disfavor on this kind of rule. In Newman v. Graham40 the Idaho
Court of Appeals struck down a rule nearly identical to North Carolina's
as arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.4 While one court may have
ruled out any durational requirement for in-state tuition,4" the Supreme
Court has summarily affirmed a district court decision upholding the
residence requirement at the University of Minnesota." This rule
required one-year in-state residence to qualify for the lower tuition rate,
but did not preclude a student from attaining resident status while attend-
ing school.44 Another court has justified such a rule on the grounds that
it is a "reasonable attempt to achieve a partial cost equalization by col-
lecting lower tuition fees from those persons who, directly or indirectly,
have recently made some contribution to the economy of the state. . .."'5
However, if the holding in Shapiro that state benefits cannot be appor-
tioned on the basis of the individual's tax contribution to the state is to
be upheld,46 a durational residence requirement for tuition purposes is
difficult to justify.47
" 82 Idaho 90, 349 P.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1960).
" Id. at 95, 349 P.2d at 719. But see Landwehr v. Board of Regents, 156 Colo.
1, 396 P.2d 451 (1964). Landwehr is probably distinguishable since the plaintiff was
challenging the statute in an action for back tuition after he had already com-
pleted school.
'Unreported lower court decision in Arizona.
,Starns v. Malkerson, 91, S. Ct. 1231 (1971).
"The completion of a year's stay in Minnesota does not in and of itself estab-
lish residence for University purposes; a person who moves to Minnesota
coincident with attending school may not be able to demonstrate that he is
acquiring Minnesota residence.
The student from out of state who proposes to establish residence must
assume the burden of proving conclusively that he has been'a resident the
required time and intends to make his permanent home in the state.
UNIVERSTY OF MINNESOTA, DULUTH BULLITIN, June 30, 1970, at 29.
" Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, -, 78 Cal. Reptr. 260, 269
(1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1970).
46 394 U.S. at 632.
"Indeed the Supreme Court appeared to speak directly to the North Carolina
situation when it said that there is "[n] o need for a state to use the one-year waiting
period as a safeguard against fraudulent receipt of benefits; for less' drastic means
are available and are employed, to minimize that hazard." 394 U.S. at 637. The
lack of a reported opinion in Starns 'makes it difficult to distinguish it from Shapiro.
A better solution would be to make nonresidence a rebuttable presumption. That
is, all newcomers to the state are presumed nonresidents for a period of time
unless otherwise shown to be residents. See Clark v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117
(S.D. Iowa 1966). The problem with this kind of provision is that rebuttal often
1971] 61,
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The one area where residence requirements have been recognized as
relevant to the state's interests is in voting requirements. North Carolina,
for example, requires one year's residence in the state and thirty days in
the precinct preceding an election.48 Such a rule seems relevant to the pur-
poses of identifying the voter, protecting against fraud, and insuring that
the voter " '[w] ill in fact become a member of the community and as such
have a common interest in all matters pertaining to its government.' ,40
Maryland's similar requirements have so been sustained by a three judge
federal court. ° Since Shapiro and other challenges to residence require-
ments, however, such residence requirements have come under even greater
challenge. At least three courts have held that a rule setting different
requirements for interstate travelers discriminates against the interstate
travelers and therefore is unconstitutional.51 One who moves from Char-
lotte, North Carolina, to Raleigh, North Carolina, will not necessarily
understand local conditions faster than someone who moves to Raleigh
from Richmond, Virginia.5 2 Accordingly, those legitimate state interests
which are served by a residence requirement for voting can be served as
well by. a uniform requirement which does not discriminate against the
individual who moves across a state line. 8
Durational residence requirements seek to forecast future behavior on
the basis of past residence alone; yet as to this objective, they are highly
inaccurate and tend only to penalize the new bona fide permanent resident.
becomes a mere test of the applicant's ingenuity in finding ways to demonstrate
residence.
N8 .C. GENI. STAT. § 163-55 (Supp. 1970).
4 9Drueding v. Devlin, 234 F. Supp. 721, 724 (D. Md. 1964).
1Id.
Hadnot v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970), aff'd, 39 U.S.L.W.
3413 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1971); Ellington v. Blumstein, - F. Supp. - (M.D. Tenn.
Sept. 9, 1970), jurisdiction noted, 91 S. Ct. 920 (1971). Canniffe v. Burg, 315
F. Supp. 380 (D. Mass. 1970), appeal filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Oct. 6,
1970) (No. 811). Contra, Fitzpatrick v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 39 U.S.L.W.
2356 (N.D. II. Dec. 15, 1970), appeal filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3362 (U.S. Feb. 12,
1971) (No. 1344). Compare Kohn v. Davis, 320 F. Supp. 246 (D. Vt. 1970),
appeal filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3347 (U.S. Feb. 10, 1971) (No. 1336) (striking down
Vermont's one-year residence requirement for voting), and Bufford v. Holton,
319 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Va.), appeal filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3.333 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1970)(No. 1270) (holding Virginia's one-year residence requirement for voting un-
constitutional), with Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904) (upholding the con-
stitutionality of Maryland's one-year residence requirement for voting), and
Cocanower v. Marston, 318 F. Supp. 402 (D. Ariz.), appeal filed, 39 U.S.L.W.
3229 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1970) (No. 799) (upholding Arizona's one-year residence re-
quirement for voting).
" See 317 F. Supp. at 1359 & note 14 smpra.
"ee Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
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ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT
In light of the decisions in Shapiro and Keenan and the questions raised
therein, the states should re-examine all of their residence requirements,
especially those for professional licenses, to insure that they protect not
only legitimate state interests but also the rights of new residents.
ANTHONY B. LAMB
Constitutional Law-Prejudgment Attachment and Garnishment-
The Progeny of the Sniadach-Kelly Marriage
In the summer of 1969, the Supreme Court held in Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp.1 that a prejudgment garnishment of wages under the facts
involved in the case constituted a taking of property without due process
of law unless the wage earner was afforded a hearing prior to the garnish-
ment. The Wisconsin garnishment procedure involved in Sniadach en-
titled one with a claim against a wage earner to a court order freezing
one half of the worker's wages until the merits of the claim could be
litigated.2 Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, stated that
"[s]uch summary procedure may well meet the requirements of due
process in extraordinary situations .... But in the present case no situa-
tion requiring special protection to a state or creditor interest is presented
by the facts .... -" The opinion noted that "[w] e deal here with wages
-a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our
economic system," 4 stressed the serious harm that wage garnishment could
cause, and concluded that the Wisconsin garnishment procedure and others
like it "may as a practical matter drive a wage-earning family to the
wall."
1395 U.S. 337 (1969).
- The statutes involved in Sniadach were Ch. 507, [1965] Wis. Sess. L. - which
were codified as Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 267.01-.24 (Supp. 1969). These statutes have
been amended and are presently codified as Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 267.01-.24 (Supp.
1970).
' Id. at 339. As examples of "extraordinary circumstances" which would justify
summary procedures, Justice Douglas cited Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc.,
339 U.S. 594 (1950) (federal statute authorizing seizure of misbranded articles
without a prior hearing); Fahey v. Mallonee, 3,32 U.S. 245 (1947) (appointment
of a conservator to take possession of a federal savings and loan association prior
to a hearing); Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928) (state statute autho-
rizing prejudgment liens on the property of stockholders of insolvent banks);
Owenby v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921) (state statute conditioning the opportunity
to appear and defend in foreign attachment proceedings upon the posting of a
bond).
'Id. at 340.Id. at 341-42.
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